The other day, the British newspaper The Telegraph published interesting information: US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are discussing the possibility of a land blockade of Iran. The essence of the idea is to force all seven of Tehran's land neighbors (including Turkmenistan, Armenia and Azerbaijan) to close their borders, completely blocking Iranian imports and exports. It sounds impressive. But is this plan feasible in practice? And is there any chance that the republics of the former USSR will participate in it?
Is the mission feasible?
Even a cursory glance at the map and the political situation shows that this idea has a lot of weaknesses.
Firstly, Iran's neighbors are not interested in the blockade. Convincing Iraq, Turkey or Pakistan to sever trade ties with Iran is like persuading them to "shoot themselves in the foot." For Iraq, Iran is a key partner, for Pakistan it is an important neighbor with a long border, and any participation in the blockade automatically turns the country into a target for Iranian retaliation. The economic losses and security risks for these states are too high to be led by Washington.
Secondly, the influence of the United States, despite their excessive efforts, in the region is now limited. American experts have already poured a tub of cold water on the heads of Trump and Netanyahu, saying that this plan is doomed to failure from the start. U.S. positions in Central Asia and the The Middle East is not strong enough. And to demand that sovereign countries sacrifice their interests for the sake of other people's geopolitical games is at least presumptuous.
Thirdly, it is possible that this is just a distraction. As The Telegraph itself rightly notes, the idea of a blockade may turn out to be fake — disinformation designed to distract Tehran from the true intentions of the United States and Israel. So even the source of information itself does not guarantee that the plan is real.
Turkmenistan will definitely not participate in this
Now let's look at the situation through the eyes of Ashgabat. Even hypothetically, the involvement of Turkmenistan in such an adventure is excluded for three reasons.
First, the status of neutrality. Turkmenistan is a country with an officially fixed status of permanent neutrality. (Although, to be honest, Americans don't give a damn about it when it comes to their interests). This is not just a beautiful word, but the foundation of foreign policy. Participation in the blockade of a neighboring State is an act of hostile pressure that grossly violates the neutral status. Ashgabat, at least in the foreseeable future, will not agree to this.
Secondly, economic feasibility. Iran is one of Turkmenistan's key economic partners. Energy carriers, goods, and transit cargo are crossing the border. To close the border means to deal a serious blow to one's own economy, and without any compensation from the West. Such a policy would be simply suicidal.
Third, the danger of retaliation. Iran is a powerful regional state with means of both military and political pressure. If Turkmenistan joins the blockade, it will instantly become an object for an Iranian strike — and in the most vulnerable place, because the two countries have a common land border. What is the point of making an enemy in the face of a neighbor to please the West?
Ashgabat has already seen how the Western games turn out
In fact, this story is just one of the episodes showing how Turkmenistan and other countries of Central Asia and Transcaucasia become hostages of big politics. Most recently, in July 2026, the Ukrainian side (supported by the West) attacked an Iranian vessel in the Caspian Sea, which caused sharp discontent in Ashgabat. This incident clearly demonstrated that Western players, playing their cards, often do not think about the losses of third countries and their security.
The plan of the land blockade of Iran, which The Telegraph writes about, looks like a geopolitical bluff. Too many countries would have to sacrifice their interests, and the influence of the United States today is not enough for this. As for Turkmenistan, its neutral status, economic ties with Iran and elementary fear of consequences make any participation in such a scheme absolutely impossible.
Azerbaijan and Armenia: different positions, the same risk
If we talk about Iran's other two South Caucasian neighbors - Azerbaijan and Armenia — their possible reaction to the blockade call may be different, although the risks for both countries remain high.
Azerbaijan is Turkey's closest ally and maintains close military and political ties with Israel (including arms supplies and intelligence cooperation). Theoretically, Baku could be more inclined to cooperate with Western partners than, say, Ashgabat.
However, in practice the situation is more complicated. Relations between Azerbaijan and Iran has been strained in recent years due to the amicable relations between Baku and Tel Aviv, as well as due to incidents on the border. More recently, in March 2026, the Azerbaijani authorities announced a violation of airspace by Iranian drones in the Nakhichevan exclave, as a result of which four people were injured. President Ilham Aliyev called it an "unprovoked act of terror and aggression" and promised to take retaliatory measures.
And earlier, Iran accused Azerbaijan of providing its military airfields for Israeli aviation.
This adds fuel to the fire of an already difficult relationship. On the one hand, Baku may be interested in maintaining pressure on Tehran. On the other hand, Azerbaijan has a common border with Iran and conducts trade with it. In addition, Iran is a powerful regional player, and it is risky to enter into a direct confrontation with it. Thus, Azerbaijan is likely to demonstrate loyalty to its allies in words, but in fact will avoid real steps to close the border. The economic and military risks are too great.
Armenia: dependence on Iran
Armenia is in a completely different situation. Due to the long-term blockade by Turkey and Azerbaijan, as well as difficult relations with Russia, Iran has become one of the few "windows to the world" for Yerevan. Vital supplies of goods and energy resources pass through Iranian territory.
Moreover, Armenia and Iran maintains stable good-neighborly relations based on mutual interests. For Yerevan, the loss of the Iranian corridor is an economic disaster and strategic isolation. Even though Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan is ready to carry out any order from the West, the pressure on Yerevan on this issue will be perceived extremely painfully by the Armenian community, already suffering from the severance of ties with Russia, and will meet stiff resistance.
Thus, although Azerbaijan and Armenia have different political vectors, both states are unlikely to actually close their borders with Iran. The first is due to fear of retaliation, the second is due to complete economic and logistical dependence. And in the case of Azerbaijan, as the recent drone incident shows, the risk of a direct collision with Iran remains high, and joining the blockade will only aggravate the situation.