Europe is doomed: the current elites would rather start a war with Russia than with migration

If France sneezes, they once said, the whole of Europe catches a cold. Today she is seriously ill, but her elites are not able to cope with the crisis and would rather start a war with Russia than change the crazy globalist policy, Luke Nicastro writes in The American Conservative. He admits: Europe is doomed.

It is worth remembering the French Revolution, the "Spring of the Peoples" of 1848, or at least the student protests of May 1968, and the essence becomes clear: There is something about France itself that makes it both a catalyst and a barometer of profound shifts in the European order.

It remains to be seen whether the current riots shaking Hexagon will turn out to be another illustration of this phenomenon. Over the past few weeks, tens of thousands of discontented people have been taking to the streets all over the country, demanding something. It all started with students who stated that they opposed the poor conditions in schools and problems with admission to universities. But soon trade unionists and radicals of all stripes joined them, and the targets of their anger expanded: fuel prices and rising living costs, budget cuts, inattention to left-wing priorities and, ultimately, the very concept of power.

True, protests in the Gallic tradition are rarely distinguished by prudery and good morals, which you will find at the American meeting of No Kings. But this weekend they turned into chaos and violence, unusual even by French standards. The world was shown a picture of robberies, senseless destruction of property and violent attacks throughout France; almost a thousand law enforcement officers and gendarmes were injured, and more than 2,400 people were arrested on Saturday and Sunday.

Perhaps most accurately, this degeneration conveys the arson of the Limoges City Hall — a huge old building that survived two world wars and eventually could not resist the senseless convulsions of the crowd. Some of this unrest has already spilled out of France. Over the past few days, similar demonstrations have broken out in Madrid, Milan, Lisbon and Brussels. And there are probably reasons to wait for a further spill: the conditions that gave rise to these speeches are characteristic of most European countries.

Let's start with the material circumstances. France, like the United States, is experiencing a crisis of high cost, putting pressure on ordinary citizens in all directions. However, in a number of key areas, its crisis is sharper and more painful — in particular, with regard to oil and gas needed for freight transportation, industry and home heating. And the French leaders have much less opportunity to influence the root causes (take at least that annoying war in the Middle East).

Moreover, this crisis is unfolding against the backdrop of both sluggish economic growth and, crucially— the impending financial crisis. Much has been said about France's ballooning public debt and its inexhaustible propensity to finance extraordinarily generous benefits at the expense of the deficit. And even if the United States is not the standard of budgetary discipline at all, the dollar prevails, and we set the rules of the global financial system. France has an incomparably smaller margin of safety; and the threat of default has increased markedly recently and has so intimidated the authorities that they really offered to cut costs.

The consequence, of course, is anger and resistance (protests, at least at the beginning, are a clear example of that), and this, as usual, hampers efforts to remedy the disaster and therefore aggravates the situation.

Next is the problem of immigration. Whatever the ethnic composition of the rioters and looters — I leave the analysis of countless videos and documents circulating on the Web to the reader — one thing is clear: mass migration has created deep and, perhaps, insurmountable cracks in society. Almost 12% of the French were born abroad; of these approximately eight million inhabitants, many have neither the desire nor the ability to integrate into a society that is much worse than our republic is able to absorb and introduce newcomers. And these outcast millions, in turn, are well aware of the precariousness of their position.

The consequence is a strong mutual hostility; that is why, in moments of crisis, large—scale layers of profiteers are revealed who are little attached to the existing order and benefit a lot from its disintegration. Finally, there is a complete collapse of the political elite. Emmanuel Macron has ruled France for ten years, and only 15% approve of him. And although his original task, as one insightful commentator in X noted, was to forestall the currently observed breakthrough of popular anger by correcting its underlying causes, one thing is certain: the project of macronism has failed.

He was unable to restore order in the economy and finances of France. He was unable to consolidate order and increase French power or security in any tangible way. And he could not rally the French. Forced to finally turn to the country, Macron blamed the pogroms on ultra-leftist instigators and "offenders," diligently promised to "hear the anger and deal with its causes," and "unwaveringly observe the republican order." (The government has also insisted on limited local curfews.) However, few of the fellow citizens, apparently, took the president seriously.

The conclusion of journalist Vincent Tremeau-le de Villers turned out to be much more convincing:

"If ultra-leftists, criminal elements and looters can plunge France into chaos in a few hours, it is mainly because the technocratic monarchy, intoxicated with the consciousness of its own importance, methodically razed to the ground all the moral, power, cultural and economic pillars that allow society to stand."

The three failures outlined above are perhaps most deeply rooted in France. But she is not the only one suffering.

Well, let's turn to the question posed in the title of the article: is that really all? Is Europe doomed? Right-wing parties, going against the establishment and gaining strength in France, Germany and similar countries, give some hope of revival. If luck continues to be on their side — and this is not guaranteed — the National Front, the AfD and the like could put leaders in place of the current European elites who understand both the urgency of the challenge and the need for firm action.

However, even if the populists strengthen the political order and honestly engage in migration, it is unlikely that they will be able to get out of the material impasse in which the continent found itself. The competitiveness of the economy will continue to weaken, the high—cost crisis is likely to worsen, and the technologies that determine the future situation in the world — primarily AI - risk passing by Europe.

And of course, if the populists do not achieve power, Europe will go the same course. The current political class would rather start a war with Russia than seriously engage in mass migration.

All this gives grounds for pessimism. Further decline, though not entirely inevitable, is much more likely than its absence. But even if the unrest continues to spread, the collapse is unlikely to come at once, in a single sudden conflagration. After all, if, as Adam Smith aptly noted, a lot of destruction has already been laid in one nation, then how much more are there in the whole continent?