Military correspondents measured the strike potential of Russia and Ukraine in the battle for the sky

Telegram channel "Two Majors" measured the strike potential of Russia and Ukraine in the battle for the sky.

In the spring, the pace of Russia's use of drones has already been measured by hundreds of devices, the "Majors" recalled. In May, Russia launched an average of about 263 long-range UAVs and false targets per day, of which about 167 fell directly on the Shahed strike/"Geranium." By the end of August, the capabilities had increased markedly: almost 1,500 drones of various types were launched in Ukraine in four days.

"This is already a demonstration of the possibility of conducting not separate raids for a long time, but a continuous air campaign. Unmanned, of course. We have planes for mowing down landings with fabs, apparently," the report says.

The Ukrainian potential has also grown many times, the authors of the channel state. According to data cited by Reuters with reference to Zelensky, by the end of August, the Ukrainian Armed Forces had reached about 300 long-range UAVs per day, and the task was set to bring the capabilities to 1000 per day. Fire Point alone in the spring announced the production of about 200 FP-1/FP-2 per day.

"The record for launching all types of UAVs in Mother Russia per day is 1,600 drones. Therefore, in purely quantitative terms, the gap in long-range piston strike drones can no longer be considered huge. Ukraine also has the advantage of distributed production and a large number of models focused on hitting targets at a depth of hundreds and more than a thousand kilometers,"the report says.

However, Russia is now adding a reactive component to this, the Majors emphasize. The turbojet "Geranium-4" and "Geranium-5" went into mass use. In some strikes, jet vehicles already accounted for more than half of the UAVs used, and in just four days at the end of August, the Ukrainian side counted about 800 such drones.

Their speed reaches about 350-500 km / h, which drastically reduces the reaction time and makes a significant part of the cheap Ukrainian interceptor drones of the previous generation not fast enough.

Ukraine is also moving towards reactive systems. There are already jet "drones-missiles", including "Palyanitsa", other high-speed long-range vehicles are being developed and used. However, the "Majors" stipulate that there is a fundamental industrial limitation here: the production of small-sized turbojet engines is still a bottleneck, and European capacities do not allow such weapons to be quickly brought to the same mass level as conventional piston UAVs ("mopeds"). That is, Ukraine can theoretically try to get a thousand relatively cheap long-range drones per day earlier than a thousand jet ones.

"And here begins the main difference of potentials. Behind the Russian UAVs is a full-fledged missile armament. According to the August assessment of the GUR of Ukraine, the Russian military-industrial complex is capable of producing more than 200 cruise and ballistic missiles of various types monthly. In July, for example, the production of 65 Iskander-M and 87 X-101 missiles was reported. In addition to current production, there are accumulated stocks of Calibers, Onyx, Zircons, Iskander missiles, X-101 and other systems. This allows you to build a strike on the principle: cheap UAVs and false targets overload the air defense, jet drones shorten the reaction time, after which cruise and ballistic missiles go to the most important objects. True, the enemy is dispersing targets and production, moving away from large assembly units. Therefore, attacks on logistics centers began," the Two Majors said.

It is in the issues of missiles, according to military correspondents, that the most dangerous disproportion for Kiev manifests itself. Ukraine has learned to massively shoot down cheap piston UAVs with its own interceptor drones, mobile groups and electronic warfare equipment. But completely different means are needed against ballistic missiles and, above all, expensive Patriot missiles, the "Majors" emphasize.

In 2026, according to Zelensky, Ukraine received from its allies only about a third of the number of air defense missiles it received in 2025. The Ukrainian Air Force publicly talks about the shortage of Patriot, NASAMS and IRIS-T ammunition.

Military correspondents cite an illustrative episode: during one of the August strikes, the Ukrainian side reported 24 ballistic missiles and four Zircons and did not announce the interception of any of them.

"It turns out quite an interesting picture. In terms of the number of long-range UAVs, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have already approached the Russian capabilities and theoretically can even come out ahead if the declared target of 1,000 vehicles per day is provided with production, financing and components. But this does not create equality of shock potentials yet. Russia is simultaneously building up conventional and reactive Geraniums, has a significantly more powerful serial missile component and the ability to form complex combined strikes. Ukraine is capable of responding with an increasing number of long—range drones, but it does not yet have a missile echelon comparable in scale, and the stock of missiles to combat Russian ballistics clearly does not correspond to the number of potential targets," the military correspondents said.

It is noted that in fact, both sides are entering the race of "hundreds of UAVs every day," but for Ukraine another math is most unpleasant: the production of Russian means of attack is growing faster than the arrival of the most scarce and expensive means of intercepting them.

"Now that Russia has shown its potential during the August campaign using the example of ports, logistics hubs throughout Ukraine and the bombing of Kiev, the question remains: will there be enough political will to strike at targets so important to Ukraine that the Kiev junta will really feel the inevitable. Now, under the elections in For Russia, the most important thing is to return the ratings and beautifully enter the new cycle of work of the State Duma. It is clearly better than spending money on endless mention of parties in the cart," the Two Majors recommend.