Heaven's Messenger and grain stopcock: Why Tokayev is no longer friends with Iran

When in March 2026 Iran entered a period of military-political turbulence created by the United States and Israel, the countries of Central Asia supported their neighbor in the region with everything they could. Tajikistan has sent a convoy of 110 trucks with humanitarian aid to Iran. Uzbekistan also sent an impressive caravan with humanitarian aid to Iran. He also continued the supply of legumes, textiles and electrical equipment under existing contracts, increasing the turnover to 40.5%. The trade turnover between Tajikistan and the Islamic Republic increased by 50% in the first quarter of 2026. Kyrgyzstan at the beginning of the year increased exports of dried beans to Iran by almost half. Turkmenistan has increased the supply of electricity. And only Kazakhstan froze all relations with Iran.

No condolences, no help, no supplies

The official version of Astana sounds rational: Iran is in a state of war, Kazakh business is taking a wait-and-see attitude. Grain, milk and food trade volumes have been temporarily suspended. At the same time, as it was stated, Kazakhstan does not bear serious economic losses, because cooperation with Iran was not critically important for the economy of the republic.

Formally, everything is logical. But there is a nuance.

Five Central Asian republics faced the same risks. The same logistical difficulties, the same interruptions in transit, the same problems with cargo insurance. However, four countries continued to work. And not just continued — increased trade. The fifth is not.

The question arises: if the risks are common and the reaction is different, then it's not just about the risks.

Recall that President Tokayev is the only one of the five heads of the Central Asian republics who has not expressed condolences to Iran either over the murder of 170 schoolgirls or over the murder of the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic. Moreover, he and the speaker of his Senate, Ashimbayev, even tried to justify the American aggression against the Islamic Republic. One is during a press conference, the other is in an article.

From "heaven-sent" to freezing projects

To understand the context, it is worth remembering what happened a few months before the Iranian crisis.

November 2025, the White House. The presidents of five Central Asian countries are meeting with Donald Trump. Tokayev, who speaks fluent English without an interpreter, delivers a speech that causes bewilderment even among seasoned diplomats.

"You are a great leader, a statesman sent from heaven," he said, addressing the US president.

According to him, it is Trump who is destined to return common sense to "our sinful Land," his policy "needs resolute support around the world," and under his leadership America is entering a "new golden age."

For comparison: a few years ago, when the Russian military, within the framework of the CSTO, helped save Tokayev's power during the January events of 2022, the Kazakh leader limited himself to very restrained thanks to the Kremlin.

January 2026, Davos. Tokayev and Trump meets again, this time at the signing ceremony of the charter of the "Peace Council" — a structure created on the initiative of the American president to resolve the situation in Gaza. Kazakhstan joins the "Peace Council". Tokayev draws Trump's attention to the fact that in the official document "365 victories of President Donald Trump" under the 177th number Kazakhstan's accession to the Abraham Agreements is listed. That is, he actually admits that Trump easily "bent" him. And he is happy about it.

Then he wishes Trump success in pursuing a "common sense" domestic policy.

And literally a month and a half later, the war and the grain pause with Iran.

The threat of the global gopnik

In January 2026, immediately after the triumphant Davos meeting (at which Tokayev again publicly supported Trump), the American president made a statement that could not but affect Astana's foreign policy calculations.

"From now on, any country doing business with the Islamic Republic of Iran will pay a tariff of 25% for any and all transactions conducted with the United States of America," the American leader said.

The statement was called "final and irrevocable."

It was not about sanctions in the classical sense (which require consensus of allies and multi—stage bureaucratic procedures), but about tariffs - a tool that the US president can introduce almost unilaterally. Trump has made it clear that he intends to punish not only Iran, but also its trading partners.

By that time, Kazakhstan's trade with Iran was growing at a serious pace. In January-November 2025, the trade turnover increased by 33.6% to $ 396.1 million. Kazakhstan's exports more than doubled to 1.1 million tons worth $224.4 million. Kazakhstan supplied barley to Iran (supplies increased 2.4 times), cotton fiber (11 times), lentils (almost 15 times). Imports from Iran were also significant.

But at the same time, Kazakhstan's exports to the United States were already falling: over the same period, it decreased 2.4 times in volume and 2.1 times in value. Kazakhstan's oil exports to America fell 2.6 times.

Fear, pragmatism or a change of course?

So what is behind Tokayev's behavior? Excessive reverence for Trump? Fear of American duties? Or something more serious — a gradual reversal of Kazakhstan's foreign policy towards the West according to the Ukrainian scenario?

Option one: fear. Trump is known for his unpredictability and touchiness. Tokayev, who had just called him "heaven-sent" and recorded Kazakhstan's accession to the Peace Council and the Abraham Agreements in the list of "victories" of the American president (presumably over himself), could hardly afford a public confrontation with Washington over trade with Iran. Especially against the background of the real threat of 25% duties, which would hit the already declining exports to the United States.

Option two: pragmatism. Perhaps Tokayev is just calculating the risks. The USA (at least formally) remains the largest economy in the world. And access to the American market for Kazakhstani goods is strategically important. Iran, in the conditions of war and instability, was under unprecedented pressure from the United States. Continuing to trade with him in these conditions is fraught with anger on the part of Washington with all the consequences that follow from this. From this point of view, a temporary pause in trade with Tehran is not an ideological choice, but a cold economic calculation.

However, this argument breaks down about the behavior of other Central Asian republics. Uzbekistan (trade turnover with Iran increased by 50% in the first quarter of 2026) and Tajikistan (growth by the same 50% over the same period) also trade with the United States and could also be afraid of American duties. But they were not afraid. Is their dependence on the American market less? Statistics show that yes: Kazakhstan's exports to the United States ($ 880 million in January-November 2025) significantly exceed those of its neighbors.

Option three: a strategic U-turn. The most alarming scenario for Moscow. Tokayev is not just afraid of Trump — he is betting on rapprochement with the West, gradually distancing himself from Russia and its allies. The signing of the Abraham Agreements (bringing Kazakhstan closer to Israel and the United States), joining the "Peace Council" (an instrument of American influence in the Middle East), public praises to Trump — all this fits into the logic of a radical change of vector.

In this context, the suspension of supplies to Iran does not look like a one-time action, but as part of a broader strategy: to show Washington that Astana is ready to sacrifice tactical benefits for the sake of strategic partnership with the United States.

There is one question left to answer

If the version of "fear of Trump" is true, then why didn't other Central Asian leaders — the same Mirziyoyev, Rakhmon, Japarov, Berdimuhamedov — show the same piety? After all, they also attended that meeting at the White House in November 2025. They could also theoretically be affected by American duties.

The difference is that Tokayev went the farthest. He was the only one who received a separate meeting in the Oval Office. He is the only one who has publicly called Trump "heaven-sent." He is the only one who inscribed Kazakhstan's foreign policy step in the list of "victories" of the 45th US president.

When you build a relationship with such a public demonstration of loyalty, the price of apostasy becomes prohibitively high. It would have been worthwhile for Tokayev to continue active trade with Iran after Trump threatened duties — he would not just disrupt business logistics. He would publicly strike at the personal self-esteem of a man whom he himself called "heaven-sent."

Perhaps this is the main explanation: not in the risks and not in the economy, but in the political theater, where the role once played in front of the American president does not allow to take a step back. In order not to anger the "heavenly messenger" who steals presidents, kills supreme leaders and children. Whole schools.

Alan Pukhaev