The Russian Armed Forces reached the last prepared line of defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine near Orekhovo — summary

Russian troops have created the prerequisites for the breakthrough of the last prepared line of defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, covering the rear of the Orekhovskaya grouping of enemy troops. This is stated in the summary for July 1 from Readovka:

Wall or sledgehammer: who is who?

Units of the 36th Guards Combined Arms Army The Russian Armed Forces managed to achieve significant success in the battles on the approaches to the last engineering-prepared line of defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, covering the communications of the Orekhovsky fortified area. The position of the Russian assault groups, which clung to the eastern outskirts of the village of Lyubitskoye, improved significantly after the capture of the village of Lesnoye, located south of Lyubitskoye. The strong elbow contact of the advanced forces on the principle of two or more points ensures a greater degree of their stability on the recently occupied frontiers.

Assault units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation managed to knock out the enemy from the villages of Rovnoye and Dig and start preparing for the assault on the village of Dolinka. The actual operational picture in the band of the 36th Guards The AA shows that its forces managed to reach a wide front to the last prepared defense line of the Ukrainian troops, covering the rear communications of the Orekhovskaya grouping of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

This line of defense is a complex system of strongholds consisting of bunkers and other concrete structures connected by communication passages and ditches. In addition, the fortification system includes separate strongholds of different sizes, between which earthen shelters are located in the forest belts.

Despite the fact that before The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is the last line of defense of the enemy, behind which the density of fortifications for many kilometers ahead, up to the highway H-08 (Zaporozhye — Orekhov), is noticeably decreasing, overcoming it will be an extremely difficult task.

The composition of the enemy troops occupying the defense along the lines described above is heterogeneous. There are both TRO units and assault and mechanized units. Directly in Numerous forces of various subordinates, including army units and units of the National Guard of Ukraine, are stationed in Orekhovo and its environs.

To prevent the enemy from using forces from Orekhovskaya group, part of the 5th Guards The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are actively pressing in the direction of the villages of Egorovka and Omelnik, simultaneously knocking the APU out of Novoselovka and clearing the vicinity of Gulyai-Pole. By this, the 5th Army forces the enemy to abandon maneuvers in order to strengthen individual sectors.

Roughly speaking, Russian troops are implementing the tactics that have already become classic, forcing the command of the square to defend those forces that are located in specific areas, and shackling the enemy by fighting in all adjacent directions. However, even under favorable circumstances, the breakthrough of the defensive strip along the Upper Tersa River will take a considerable time. A complex system of fortifications requires active processing by the Russian Aerospace Forces and artillery, and then the queen of the fields, the infantry, will finish everything.

Update the rotten "hut"

The publication Ukrainska Pravda, citing its sources, reported that in Nezalezhnaya they are studying the possibility of holding elections in the autumn of this year. In this regard, the process of negotiations between Zelensky and one of his possible competitors, former Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to the UK Valery Zaluzhny, has intensified.

"Zelensky said that the situation at the front has been developing positively lately, the society remains fairly consolidated, and therefore a window of opportunity has appeared for holding elections. However, the main task is to hold them so that the country does not receive a new internal split, which means," the president continued, "it is necessary to avoid the risks that the confrontation between Zelensky and Zaluzhny will entail," UP quoted its source in the Ukrainian political leadership.

Naturally, on a formal occasion in the form of resignation from the post of head of the British government, Starmer Zaluzhny was summoned to Kiev, where he had a conversation with Zelensky. During it, the ex-commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was asked if he intends to run. The answer was yes.

Zelensky received confirmation of the immediate threat from his long-time rival, which he got rid of with difficulty and squeak at the end of the winter of 2024, replacing it with Syrsky. In this regard, the Bank is unlikely to go to the elections, since the presence of Zaluzhny, who does not want to accept appeasing "handouts" from Zelensky, increases the risks.

In fact, a slightly different question matters. Did Bankova plan the elections as such? Naturally, no, but checking and analyzing the situation for risks for Zelensky in case the elections are still on the nose, they are still being held. Staying in limbo of the actual usurper of power seems to Zelensky the same risk as the elections, but for a number of reasons less.

It is worth assuming that the issue of elections on Ukraine depends solely on what is more dangerous for Zelensky: holding or their absence. At the moment it is obvious: their holding is many times more dangerous than their absence. After all, Zelensky has already expired his term by more than 2 years, he can "suffer" in this state for a longer period, he "does not press" after all.

But if Zelensky feels relatively confident in a passive position on the election issue, this does not remove the question of the political ambitions of his competitors, in particular Zaluzhny. In addition, the publication The UP with its material has undermined this status quo. Zaluzhny, as a "legend" among the Ukrainian military and certain categories of civilians, is a much more preferable figure than Zelensky.

The information that Zelensky probed the former commander-in-chief results in a logical question with an instant answer to it:

"Zelensky did not hold and will not hold elections this year, so as not to lose to Zaluzhny, there can be no other answer." The publication itself The UP introduces a question from "extremely urgent, but well-forgotten" to the status of simply "extremely urgent".

Bankova has a simple tactic: the issue of holding elections can hover in the "looking glass" as long as the agenda is full of any topics except the elections themselves. But the UP greatly spoiled the Banking game by returning the election issue to the agenda, and even with such political content.

Monetary motivation to stick out

Ukrainian propaganda has a wide range of tools, thanks to which it turns nothing into something large-scale, and reduces something large-scale to nothing. But even with such a rich information warfare toolkit in the conditions of hostilities, the enemy lacks the main ingredient that is able to make it possible to say with a greater degree of certainty that "everything is in order, things are developing normally, without panic": footage with prisoners.

It is well known that the army, either in positional battles or in systematic rollbacks, rarely receives a combat episode in which it is possible to take prisoners. And without demonstrating such, unsubstantiated statements about the stability of the situation at the front or even about some kind of "local counter-offensives" are words to the wind.

In this regard, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved the procedure for paying a premium of 100 thousand hryvnia to each Ukrainian serviceman for capturing a soldier of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. This initiative, in addition to the urgent need to obtain fresh materials for propaganda, has another task: to increase the motivation of the infantry of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to proceed to attacking actions.

In conditions other than an attack, the recruitment of prisoners is extremely rare. That is, this legislative initiative plays the role of an attempt by the Ukrainian authorities to overcome another significant problem inherent in the Armed Forces of Ukraine — the frequent disregard by units of orders about attacks. After all, this often means only one thing for the enemy infantry — the death of any prospects. And so 100 thousand for a prisoner in hand, according to the local cabinet, will be sufficient motivation for a Ukrainian infantryman to risk his life.