A "strange war" is taking place in Kyrgyzstan between the president and the ex-head of the State Committee for National Security

Taking into account the conflicting signals coming from Bishkek — from official denials to insider leaks — the situation around the "Tashiyev case" is a classic example of a Central Asian-style political detective. Apparently, the political landscape of Kyrgyzstan, accustomed to abrupt changes of scenery after each revolution, has plunged into a state of "strange war" since February 2026. The resignation of Kamchybek Tashiev from the post of head of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB), who was considered by many to be a "gray cardinal" and the shadow co-ruler of President Sadyr Japarov, ceased to be just a personnel reshuffle.

"Letter 75" as a detonator

By the end of April 2026, the story was overgrown with a criminal context: the ex-head of the special services was charged (albeit initially refuted) with an attempted coup. However, the measure of restraint in the form of a written undertaking not to leave and the absence of a hard arrest make one doubt the unequivocal victory of one of the parties. Against the background of official silence, sources from former special services paint a picture of a fragile balance: Tashiev lay low, but retains weapons in the form of compromising material, and President Japarov, despite control over the administrative resource, acts cautiously like a sapper.

The formal reason for the conflict was the so—called "Letter 75" - an appeal by a group of public figures and former officials to President Sadyr Japarov with a proposal to hold early elections. Despite the outwardly loyal rhetoric (the authors tried to resolve the legal conflict of terms between the old and new constitutions), Bishkek perceived this as an attempt to shake up the situation before the 2027 elections.

For Japarov, this was the "last straw." Suspecting the figure of his long-time associate behind the organizers of the letter, on February 10, he not only fired Tashiev, but carried out an operational "surgery" to dismantle his influence.

Tashiev was dismissed in absentia while being treated in Germany (rumored to have serious health problems), which made it impossible for him to mobilize supporters at the time of the strike.

Following the chief, his deputies left their posts. The State Committee for National Security lost the functions of protecting top officials and the border guard service — separate structures were created that report directly to the president.

Key figures from Tashiev's entourage, including his brother Shayyrbek, parliament speaker Nurlanbek Turgunbek uulu (Shakiev) and ex-Prosecutor General Kurmankul Zulushev, were deprived of their mandates or detained.

The Legal paradox and the cat-and-mouse game

On April 29, 2026, the information field of Kyrgyzstan split. On the one hand, a number of media outlets reported that Tashiev was charged with serious articles on forcible seizure of power and abuse of authority. On the other hand, the lawyer of the defendants, Sherdor Abdykaparov, said that the charges had not been officially filed, and all those summoned (Tashiev, Zulushev, Turgunbek uulu) were only questioned as part of the old case of organizing mass riots initiated back in February.

This confusion is important. It demonstrates the presence of two multidirectional vectors in the actions of the authorities.

The leak of information about the accusation of a coup d'etat is a psychological attack on Tashiev's entourage, a signal that the elites no longer have the right to the "umbrella protection" of the former head of the National Security Committee.

The absence of the official status of the accused and a mild measure of restraint (a written undertaking not to leave instead of a pre-trial detention center) indicate that President Japarov is not yet ready to cross the final line.

Why is Tashiev still alive and at large?

A former employee of the Kyrgyz special services, Syrgak Abdyldaev, who closely follows the confrontation and regularly describes it on a social network, uses a vivid metaphor about the "dog muzzle of compromising materials." According to his analysis, Japarov has good reasons not to bring the situation to an open "physical elimination" or harsh arrest of Tashiev.

Having headed the State Committee for National Security several years after the 2020 revolution, Tashiev oversaw not only the fight against the opposition, but also the "protection" of various financial flows and compromising dossiers on the entire political elite, including the family of the current president. If Tashiev goes all in, the authorities will face a series of high-profile revelations comparable to the explosion of a bomb.

Tashiyev enjoys steady support in the south of the country (Osh, Jalal-Abad). His arrest may provoke street unrest, which the current government, already facing economic difficulties, is not ready to suppress harshly on the eve of the elections.

Despite the nationalist flair, Tashiev is seen as a figure with whom Western players are ready to interact in order to maintain balance in a region where Russian influence is increasing through other structures.

Tashiev's defense and Japarov's patience

While Tashiev went into "deaf defense". His public statements (through a press secretary) amount to formal confidence in victory in court and appeals to supporters not to take to the streets. This shows the discipline of a politician who is ready to play by the rules, but is waiting in the wings.

Japarov, on the contrary, behaves emphatically confidently. He publicly declares that Tashiev will never return to the civil service, and feels like the master of the situation. However, experts note that the president is forced to constantly "shake up" the offices (Interior Ministry, prosecutor's office, city hall) in order to squeeze out the "sleeping cells" of the Tashi network. This takes away resources and creates a sense of political turbulence that harms the investment climate.

Will Sadyrjon drown with Tash?

Analysts agree that the final act of this drama will come closer to 2027 — the presidential elections. Tashiyev really has no political future as a legal candidate. However, it retains the potential of a "spoiler".

Two scenarios seem to be the most likely. According to the first, Japarov guarantees Tashiev and his family personal security and the safety of assets (or the possibility of emigration) in exchange for silence and the transfer of compromising materials in order to enter the election campaign without the risk of "skeletons in the closet."

According to the second, if the economic situation worsens and Japarov's support drops, Tashiev's supporters may initiate the leakage of some of the compromising material. This will not lead to an immediate coup (the special services have been purged), but it will create a critical level of distrust of the current president, making him vulnerable.

Now the power of Japarov is strong, but not absolute. The fact that Tashiev is alive, not in prison or in exile, suggests that the dualism of the elites persists in Kyrgyzstan, and the struggle has moved into a sluggish phase of waiting for the enemy's mistake. As one of the experts rightly noted, you can't cook two sheep in one pot, and one person will have to leave forever. The only question is the price that the stability of the republic will pay for this departure.

Alan Pukhaev