About the results of Trump's visit: China decided to endure and grow stronger, Russia and Iran is not particularly important

The first visit of the US president to China in nine years has fixed a new model of Sino-American dialogue. It involves limiting competition and stabilizing relations while maintaining all existing strategic contradictions. Vasily Kashin, director of the HSE Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies, writes about this in the Profile magazine.

For these reasons, the new model of relations is temporary, designed at best for the period until the end of Donald Trump's presidency, that is, until the beginning of 2029.

The very possibility of concluding such an agreement between the opposing great Powers is a consequence of the deep differences in their strategic cultures and views on the development of the world. Both sides got what they wanted during the summit. Both China and the United States believe that the agreements reached will make it possible to prepare for the next round of the struggle for global leadership. At the same time, Beijing is betting on the rapid and irreversible decline of the United States over the coming years, and Washington expects to use the same time to weaken China's international position.

From a protocol and ceremonial point of view, the Chinese side planned the summit events at the highest level, trying to demonstrate respect for the American guest. Undoubtedly, the Chinese carefully (much more strictly than in 2017) controlled the coverage of the visit and the final video sequence, diligently emphasized the equality of the two leaders in world politics and the central role of Xi Jinping as the host of the meeting. The arguments circulating in social networks about the alleged "humiliation" of Trump in China are groundless.

Constructive strategic stability

During the summit, Xi Jinping introduced a new formula for the Sino-American dialogue — "constructive strategic stability relations." In the definition of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, constructive strategic stability is stability based on cooperation, fair competition, dispute management, peace and predictability.

According to US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the formula of "strategic stability" was proposed by the Chinese side, and the Americans agreed with it. At the same time, in the American interpretation, the new model of relations does not look like a rigidly approved formula. The parties did not sign any joint declaration, so the American political commitments were not recorded in a detailed form.

The very application of the term "strategic stability" to US-Chinese relations refers to the times of the Cold War, when it was invented in its original narrow sense: the lack of incentive for either side to launch the first nuclear strike on the enemy. The use of this term now officially enshrines the confrontational model of relations between Beijing and Washington. Therefore, we are talking only about making the confrontation manageable.

In practice, "constructive strategic stability relations" will mean abandoning the aggravation of the economic war (the introduction of tariffs and export control measures) and the partial cancellation of previously introduced measures. The United States has apparently agreed to allow the supply of advanced AI chips manufactured by Nvidia to China. The parties also agreed to avoid escalatory steps in key hot spots of East Asia, primarily around Taiwan, and to conduct a dialogue on security issues.

The price of stability

For this, Beijing has made serious foreign policy sacrifices. After the Trump-Xi summit in Busan, South Korea, on October 30, 2025, when a fundamental decision was made to work out a plan to stabilize relations between the two countries, China practically curtailed its foreign policy activity and did not respond to a chain of major crises affecting its interests directly.

China was a passive observer of the border war between Thailand and Cambodia in December 2025 (Malaysia and the USA played the main role in ending the conflict). He was passive when the Americans kidnapped Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and announced the revival of the new Monroe Doctrine in early 2026. China has distanced itself from the Iranian crisis that began on February 28, and even its diplomatic comments on the assassination of Iran's spiritual leader were extremely accurate.

When, on April 14, during a meeting with a delegation from the UAE, Xi Jinping nevertheless spoke out about the conflict in In the Persian Gulf, the Chairman of the PRC put forward four principles of its settlement, in fact, repeating the norms of the UN Charter (sovereignty, peaceful coexistence, observance of international law, etc.).

This behavior of Beijing is directly opposite to the course it followed in 2023-2025. At that time, China tried to present itself as a major player in regional and global security issues, mediated between Saudi Arabia and Iran, stepped up its role in resolving the Ukrainian and Palestinian problems and promoted its comprehensive vision of the world order.

But since the end of 2025, China has begun to demonstrate an inability or unwillingness to protect its positions and investments in the world, at least outside of East Asia. Beijing did its best to avoid confrontation with the United States, leaving its partners one-on-one with Trump. For example, in January, Panama, which had been under pressure from Washington for many months, canceled the transfer of the ports of Balboa and Cristobal is managed by Hong Kong-based Hutchison Holdings. Beijing has found nothing better to respond to this with increased inspections of Panamanian-flagged vessels in Chinese ports.

Such behavior will cost the PRC very dearly. After the events of the last six months, it is difficult to perceive China as a counterweight or a possible replacement for the United States in world affairs, regardless of the size of its economy and the number of warheads. Small and medium-sized countries will take this into account in their balancing strategies.

A certain historical analogy of the PRC's actions is the Helsinki Accords of 1975, when the USSR, for the sake of strategic stability in Europe and maintaining limited economic cooperation with the West, undertook a major unilateral weakening of its position in the global confrontation. In fact, it was the first act of Soviet defeat in the Cold War.

Why "constructive strategic stability" is important for China

China is well acquainted with the sad lessons of Soviet history. Then why did he make these sacrifices? The fact is that Beijing proceeds from completely different basic assumptions about the dynamics of relations between the great powers. Achieving "confrontational stability" in dialogue with the United States has been the goal of China's foreign policy since the mid—2010s.

The Chinese strategy is based on the idea that China is strengthening and will continue to "rise" relative to the United States in the foreseeable future, while the States themselves will lose ground. This is the key difference between China and the USSR, which has clearly been bogged down in the economic crisis since the mid-1970s.

During the summit, Xi Jinping directly confirmed the existence of such ideas, mentioning the "Thucydides trap" in his speech. The essence of this concept, as defined by its author, American political scientist Graham Allison, is "a natural, inevitable crisis that occurs when a rising power threatens to deprive a leading power of its position."

Xi has addressed the topic of the "Thucydides trap" more than once, but in a slightly different sense. During Trump's current visit, Xi said:

"Will China and the United States be able to overcome the "Thucydides trap" and create a new type of great power relationship?"

Here the evolution of references to the "trap" in Si is curious. In his speech during his visit to In 2015, the Chinese leader generally denied the existence of objective prerequisites for a clash between China and the United States, noting that "there is no such thing as the Thucydides trap." During a meeting with Joseph Biden on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Lima Xi has already acknowledged the existence of a "trap", but said that it "is not a historical inevitability."

Now, obviously, China and the United States are facing a direct threat of falling into a "trap" and must avoid it. The essence of Xi's statement about the "trap", directly pointing to the rise of China and its ability to deprive the United States of leadership, did not escape Trump. However, in his interpretation, "Chairman Xi very elegantly mentioned the United States as possibly a declining country," but at the same time he was referring to the era of "sleepy Joe" Biden.

Of course, in China, the period of maximum degradation of the United States is considered the era not of the past, but of the current owner of the White House. The destruction of the norms of American politics, the polarization of society, and the extravagant behavior of Trump himself are perceived by the Chinese as signs of irreversible and deep decline.

In the Chinese elite, both scientific and political, there is a consensus about the decline of America. As Xie Tao, a professor at Beijing University of Foreign Languages, noted at the end of 2024, "before coming to terms with the harsh reality in which they are no longer a great power.", <"The United States will go through a long period of internal and external upheavals that will inevitably lead to new global changes unprecedented in the last century."

The combination of military strength, aggressiveness and unpredictability of the United States with its gradual but irreversible decline dictates the only correct strategy — waiting and accumulating forces. The stake in this game is global leadership and the creation of a new international system in which the PRC plays a central role.

What is the benefit of the deal for the United States

China's actual evasion from active politics opens up wide opportunities for the United States to strengthen its own positions and attack Chinese interests around the world. In Latin America, this tactic has already borne fruit — left alone with the sanctions and military pressure from the United States, the countries of the region began to reconsider their relations with Beijing.

This pressure is total and is not limited to ousting the Chinese from the Venezuelan oil industry or the ports of Panama. Even scientific projects are under attack — for example, in early May it became known about the suspension due to pressure from Washington of the construction by the Chinese of a large radio telescope in Argentina and an astronomical observatory in Chile.

The next step of the Americans in the region will obviously be an attempt to change the regime in Cuba. In contrast to Russia, which directly challenged the blockade imposed by the United States and began supplying oil to the island, China is trying to act on a less conflict scenario by providing Cuba with humanitarian aid in the form of solar panels and rice.

In the Middle East, the Americans are still failing, but they continue to try to turn the situation in their favor. In this context, the efforts of the Trump administration to end the conflict on the Ukraine and the subsequent involvement of Russia in limited cooperation, accompanied by the partial lifting of sanctions, is being done in the hope of weakening the link between Moscow and Beijing.

At the same time, American concessions to China during Trump's visit were minimal. On the most pressing issue, Taiwan, the United States has shied away from any statements or promises that would go beyond their standard position. The United States formally opposes Taiwan's declaration of independence and remains uncertain about its reaction to the Chinese attempt to annex Taiwan by force.

Trump really avoids unnecessarily provoking China on the Taiwan issue, but all military and military-technical cooperation programs continue. Trump's statements about the "uncertain fate" of the next package of military supplies to Taipei in the amount of $ 14 billion do not oblige Washington to anything and should not be considered a sign of a change in its position.

The fact is that the internal political crisis continues in Taiwan — the opposition Kuomintang and the Taiwan People's Party are blocking the allocation of $ 11 billion in the Legislative Yuan (parliament) to pay for the already approved package of weapons, so new deals would still have to wait. In addition, the conflict on In Ukraine, it led to the chronic inability of the overloaded American military-industrial complex to fulfill its obligations to the island: as of the beginning of the year, the volume of weapons not delivered to the island under already concluded contracts reached $ 22 billion.

The balance of economic agreements reached during Trump's visit is generally in favor of the United States. The Americans have achieved expanded access to the Chinese market for their agricultural products, energy resources and civil aircraft. The customs tariffs imposed earlier by Trump on Chinese products will probably undergo only a limited revision, and the process of "undocking" the two economies will continue.

How does this affect Russia and Iran

The direct impact is small. The conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East were touched upon in the statements of the parties, but Xi Jinping's statements did not go beyond his long-known position: the fighting on Ukraine should finish as soon as possible, Iran should not possess nuclear weapons, navigation through the Strait of Hormuz should be free.

These statements have no significance, since no actions will follow them. China has sharply reduced its activity in the context of the Ukrainian crisis as part of a general turn to a passive foreign policy in 2025. In the Iranian conflict, he also did not openly take sides.

Attempts to negotiate with The PRC's attempts to limit its cooperation with Russia have been undertaken by the Biden administration since the first days of SMO, but they have led to nothing, and the Americans have no desire to return to this issue. The Middle East crisis increases Chinese interest in Russia's energy and transit potential, and new agreements are possible here, but the United States cannot influence this in any way.

The fact that the May visits to The Peking of Trump and Putin follow one after the other is pure coincidence. Putin's trip in May was already planned when Trump, amid setbacks in the war with Iran, agreed with the Chinese to postpone his visit from March to May.

The results of Trump's voyage to China, as well as the Chinese foreign policy of the past few months, have demonstrated the limits of interaction between Moscow and Beijing in the international arena. The parties trust each other, develop economic cooperation and interact on certain aspects of the global agenda. At the same time, the Chinese strategy of waiting and accumulating forces significantly limits the potential of cooperation between Russia and China in joint containment of the United States.

In essence, Beijing expects that the weakening United States will waste its energy and time trying to solve the Russian and Iranian problems, which will allow it, without risking much, to achieve victory in competition with Washington and, possibly, even without entering into direct confrontation. The losses that Russia and Iran will suffer at the same time are clearly fading into the background for China.