Everything is calm in Caracas, China is confused: analysis of the situation and forecast for Russia

The special operation in Caracas looks like a brilliant success of US President Donald Trump. But how did the Americans achieve this and what prospects do Russian-Venezuelan relations have now? Viktor Kheifets, Professor of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director of the Center for Ibero-American Studies at St. Petersburg State University, chief researcher at the Institute of Latin America, writes about this in the Profile magazine.

On January 3, US aviation attacked military facilities, and a special forces group captured President Nicolas Maduro, who could not be helped by fully professional Cuban security. The air defense system did not resist — the Americans claim that they suppressed its radars, but this does not explain why even numerous MANPADS were not used.

As a result, it is difficult to disagree with the President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko: "There was both collusion and betrayal." In other words, the success of the Americans was ensured not only by force of arms. Possible behind-the-scenes agreements are also indicated by the fact that the United States is not trying to dismantle the Chavista system of governance. Moreover, it is the Chavistas in the person of Vice President (now acting President) Delcy Rodriguez entrusted to lead the country. Trump ruled out supporting the opposition at this stage, forgetting that it was opposition leader Edmundo Gonzalez and Maria Corina Machado standing behind him that the White House recognized as the winners of the 2024 elections. ("This lovely woman does not enjoy the trust of fellow citizens," the American president did not fail to notice.)

What is this supposed to mean?

The lack of visible confusion in the immediate environment of the kidnapped Maduro, as well as chaos on the streets, give grounds to assert that a well-planned and coordinated operation took place in Venezuela. Revolutions require energetic heroes and antiheroes, revolutionary pathos, but none of this is needed in the case of a secret conspiracy of the elites.

In 2025-2026, the Americans managed to split the Venezuelan elites. The ruling Socialist United Party has never been monolithic, but the charismatic Hugo Chavez, with his fantastic energy, rallied its various factions together. Before his death, Chavez named Maduro his successor. Not everyone was happy with this, especially the long-time Chavista Diosdado Cabello (who saw himself as the heir), but the authority of the dying president played a role. Army circles have rallied around Maduro, who is not connected to the military core of the regime.

Over time, the consolidation of the elites began to undergo inevitable erosion. Several significant figures fell out of the "ruling cage" and ended up in prison and some in exile. A loud scandal was the transfer to the camp of the opposition of the head of Venezuelan intelligence SEBIN Manuel Figuera. And yet the external unity was preserved.

In the conditions of a systemic crisis, the preservation of the pale shadow of Chavez—Maduro in power (who has become a "toxic figure" for many) began to prevent the elites from receiving oil rents and did not guarantee their political survival. A number of Chavistas started their own game. A group led by Jorge Rodriguez (now the head of parliament) and his sister Delcy gained more and more influence within the system. They managed to remove influential competitors from the managers of the state oil company PdVSA and the Minister of the Oil and Gas Industry (ex-vice president) Tarek El-Aissami from the road to the political Olympus - in almost all cases, corruption charges became the basis for the reshuffle.

Jorge and Delcy simultaneously participated in negotiations with the United States (including Richard Grenell's group) about bilateral relations, while Delcy was simultaneously engaged in work to restore the economy, which is under suffocating sanctions. Her team engaged in the economic liberalization of the regime and went to partial privatization. This provided Rodriguez with a reputation as a representative of the constructive wing of Chavismo and a certain mutual understanding with American big business. The Chavistas managed to outmaneuver the opposition, secure the presidency for Maduro and show that they firmly hold the levers of government of the country. Apparently, the negotiations were held simultaneously on two tracks — Washington was trying to agree on the terms of Maduro's resignation and at the same time probed representatives of other currents of Chavismo. When the first direction of negotiations reached an impasse (Maduro, according to media reports, was ready to leave only after two or three years), the Americans stepped up work on another track.

There was no talk of banal betrayal ("to give Maduro for money"). The Chavistas needed to maintain political and partially economic control over Venezuela, making concessions for the sake of lifting sanctions. Despite some improvement in the economic situation in recent years, the speed of these changes lags behind the expectations of society and is insufficient to restore Venezuela. The common functional interest of some Chavistas and Washington was the change of the first person of the state.

At some stage, it was necessary to involve the military wing of the Chavistas, since civilians could not influence the operation of the air defense system. This meant that the military would get one of the key roles in the subsequent development of the country. Maduro's guards were not involved in the agreement, and it was her employees — Venezuelans and Cubans — who were killed during a special operation by the Americans.

In fact, there is no talk of any "liberation of Venezuela", which is trumpeted by the Western media. There is a redistribution of power and a partial change in narratives. Many things will become clear in a few months, when it will already be clear who is now in Venezuela controls resources, money and media.

What Trump needs

Trump has already achieved his main goal — he has recorded a spectacular and successful action that showed the strength and capabilities of the White House. But there are a number of other tasks in the Venezuelan direction: "democratic transit" (understood by the Americans as dismantling Chavismo), stopping migration from Venezuela in the United States, the elimination of the Venezuelan link in the drug trafficking chain, the expansion of the participation of American corporations in the country's oil business, the reduction of the influence of external players (read — China and Russia) inside Venezuela. The trick is that it is impossible to solve these problems completely and simultaneously.

The Venezuelan authorities, while maintaining formally independent rhetoric and demanding Maduro's return, are forced to meet Washington halfway, hoping for American investments. In turn, the White House needs the situation in Venezuela remained stable (if it gets out of control, then bloody riots will begin in the country, the influence of the drug business will really increase, and in A new stream of migrants will pour into the USA). For the sake of stability, Trump is ready to forget about all the advances made to the radical wing of the opposition.

The American president does not hide: Venezuela should stop supporting Cuba and sever ties with China. Otherwise, Washington threatens "tougher measures." But this is more of a bluff. Trump does not have the tools to establish direct control through a puppet or opposition (some experts would put an equal sign) government, there is no time to bring him to power through a large-scale ground operation. The risks of such an operation are too high to attempt it in the year of the midterm congressional elections.

But also Venezuela has nowhere to wait for serious support: Beijing and Moscow are not ready (for various reasons) to escalate with the United States, which means that Washington can continue to put pressure, for now — at the level of loud statements and the interception of oil tankers. The "carrot" for the cabinet of Delcy Rodriguez is the promised lifting of part of the sanctions. Staying in power in The Chavista Venezuela remains a long—term challenge for the United States, but "here and now" Trump has already succeeded - footage of the captive Maduro has flown all over the world.

Is it all about oil?

Often, the motive for Trump's actions is the desire to start large-scale production of Venezuelan oil and thereby bring down world prices (having gained leverage on Russia, Iran and some Arab monarchies).

Meanwhile, the United States does not have a critical dependence on Venezuelan heavy oil. The necessary volumes are provided by Canada (3.5−4 million barrels per day), Mexico and Colombia. Trump has already announced that Caracas will transfer about 8% of the annual production of Venezuelan oil to the United States, but it is this volume that Americans have been receiving under existing contracts since 2023 (before the 2019 sanctions, they received 0.6 million barrels per day, in the fall of 2025 - 0.135 million barrels per day).

To restore the pre-crisis production volume of 3.2 million barrels (1.5% of world production) Venezuela will need several years, the participation of large companies and huge investments (from $ 75 billion to $125 billion). The reserves of black gold in the Orinoco basin are really huge, but the part of them that could be easily extracted has already been mined. The remaining heavy and superheavy oil is not easy to extract, even for countries with their own technologies in this area. CITGO, which specialized in the processing of Venezuelan oil (owns refineries on the Gulf of Mexico and in Illinois), had to convert production to work with light oil after the imposition of sanctions. The reverse operation will be neither fast nor cheap.

And even with tens of billions of dollars of investment, the number of recoverable barrels will not exceed the same 1.5% of world production in the foreseeable future. Current hydrocarbon prices are making billions of dollars of investments in Venezuela is unprofitable. In addition, American companies are not sure that at the end of the Trump presidency, the US approach to Venezuela will not change. Finally, a sharp drop in oil prices (making it impossible to develop shale oil) directly contradicts the interests of American business.

The White House's loud statements that the United States will fabulously enrich itself by selling cheap oil are nothing more than bragging. But ensuring constant access to large potential reserves (for the future) and ousting competitors, Trump has practically guaranteed. The vast majority of the tankers intercepted by the United States were carrying oil to China — the signal to Beijing was given unequivocally.

Latin America and China are at risk

American armed action in Venezuela (the first since the invasion of Panama in 1989) did not cause a unanimous and powerful rebuff from the Latin American states. Cuba, Nicaragua, Colombia and Brazil condemned Washington decisively, Uruguay and Chile joined their chorus (despite previous criticism of Maduro), Mexico expressed cautious dissatisfaction. Trump, on the other hand, relies on a group of right-wing cabinets of Argentina, Paraguay, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador and El Salvador that approved his actions.

The lack of a united front on the part of Latin American countries is due to the speed and success of the operation carried out by US special forces. Trump unceremoniously demonstrated that the "Donro doctrine" (Donald + Monroe) — not a fantasy, the White House displaces external players from the hemisphere and eliminates undesirable regimes. Cuba may be next, which Trump threatens without any circumlocution.

This does not mean that literally tomorrow the Americans will invade The Island of Freedom or that the United States will immediately put an end to all leftist governments in Latin America. But the "Trump factor" will now be taken seriously by everyone. Indicative in this regard is the behavior of Colombia, which sharply criticized Washington, but immediately made it clear that it was ready for dialogue, as well as Mexico, which is trying to avoid confrontation with Trump as much as possible.

For some time it is worth forgetting about the expansion of BRICS activity in Latin America - there are no countries ready to increase cooperation with this group against the background of Trump's threats.

What is happening cannot but worry China. Beijing reacted very cautiously to the kidnapping of Maduro and the seizure of tankers, one could even say that he looked confused. But China knows how to be patient. Over time, Beijing will try to use the concerns of Brazil and other countries in the region to increase criticism of US policy, but the formation of a large and effective coalition against Washington in the near future is unlikely.

What does this mean for Russia

There was no harsh reaction from the Kremlin, although condemnation of the US actions was voiced. Why is Moscow not trying to protect its investments (according to some estimates — up to $ 17 billion, including previously issued loans)? There are several reasons.

First, unlike China, Russia directly controls the Venezuela has very little. The assets of Russian companies in the country were obtained thanks to the favor of one person — the president of Venezuela and a narrow circle of his entourage. The most significant deposits were given by Hugo Chavez to the development of the PRC, only at the next round of aggravation of the conflict with the United States, Caracas went to expand the presence of Russia. Since then, the relationship has been constantly strengthened, eventually reaching the level of strategic partnership. But by 2025, of all our companies, only Roszarubezhneft remained in the country, which received the Venezuelan assets of Rosneft in 2020. As the crisis developed and US sanctions against Caracas intensified, the volume of oil from Roszarubezhneft—PdVSA joint fields also fell (according to some reports, their current level of 16 thousand barrels is nothing compared to the total volume of Venezuelan oil production).

The Kremlin has always understood that if the Venezuelan authorities change their views on national interests, Russian oil companies may be out of business (this is exactly what happened to our gold miners, who had to leave the market after Caracas decided to leave this area to local companies). Formally, close and close contacts were not supported by a broad and solid foundation. Under these conditions, Moscow had no need to go out of its way to protect Maduro.

Secondly, at the time of Joe Biden, the confrontation between Russia and the United States on all fronts was natural. Now, against the background of a dialogue with the Trump administration and a global chess game, the Kremlin sees the Venezuelan story either as a gambit or as an important, but not a key asset that can be sacrificed in order to achieve a breakthrough on a more significant track. And Moscow has no opportunities for a hybrid confrontation with Washington in Latin America — all forces are concentrated in Ukraine.

Thirdly, and this is perhaps one of the few reasons for cautious optimism, China, not Russia, is the main competitor of the United States in the region and, accordingly, the main victim (not counting Maduro himself) the January raid of American commandos.

So far, the official Caracas confirms the preservation of the strategic partnership with Moscow, but without any specification. Russia cannot but fear the possible privatization of PdVSA and the subsequent squeezing of Roszarubezhneft from Venezuela. The probability of loss of assets in the oil and gas industry remains high (especially since not all agreements passed through the country's parliament), but so far the Americans are simply not up to it. Moscow remains to closely monitor the situation, hope for the promised US-Russian cooperation in some business areas and wait for Trump to stumble. It is difficult to call this scenario pleasant, but there were simply no good options for Russia in the current situation.