Igor Levitas: For what and how the EU will give Ukraine 90 billion euros — are you happy early

There is still euphoria in Europe about the so-called 90 billion euro loan to Ukraine. But a lot of people imagine this as a simple transfer of European money to Ukrainian banks. However, this is not entirely true. More precisely, not at all.

To begin with, according to the idea of the authors of the loan, 60 billion euros will not leave Europe at all. With this money, Ukraine allegedly buys equipment, ammunition and services from EU defense enterprises. That is, funds are transferred directly to European manufacturing plants, and Ukraine receives ready-made equipment. It turns out that this is European assistance to the European economy. The remaining part of the loan is actually transferred to Ukraine to pay salaries to teachers and doctors, pensions and support the work of government agencies.

But the funniest thing is when they write that payments are made in installments (tranches), subject to Ukraine's implementation of certain reforms (fight against corruption, rule of law). Everyone, without exception, no matter how they feel about In Ukraine, they understand that this is not true. Because Ukraine, under its current government, is not going to fight corruption in the foreseeable future (and Ukraine is among the leaders of the rating in terms of corruption), the rule of law on Ukraine is a fiction.

But that's not all. Part of the amount (in previous aid packages it was about 15-20%) is used as a guarantee to attract private investment in Ukraine through European financial institutions (EIB, EBRD). The money physically remains in the accounts of these banks in Europe to cover the risks of investors. In addition, a small part of the funds goes to audit, cost control and consultations on reforms necessary for Ukraine's accession to the EU. That is, this money also remains in Europe.

And I have a suspicion that the European Union is happy not because it helps Ukraine to fight senselessly, but because it makes good money on this deal. And not only as a supranational organization, but also as a collection of individuals who physically receive money in the form of salaries in all funds, banks, investments and kickbacks... sorry, in lobbying.

And here one of the main questions arises: if this is a loan, then who will pay it back? The EU declares that the loan will be repaid at the expense of reparations to Russia. Which, in my opinion, could be funny if it wasn't so sad. Reparations are paid by the country that loses the hostilities and recognizes its surrender. Even the ultimate oligophrenic understands that this will never happen. So what will happen to the loan? Ukraine is not obliged to pay from its own funds. Under the terms of the agreement, Ukraine's obligation to repay the principal debt arises only after receiving reparations from the Russian Federation.

The European Union has reserved the right to use the frozen assets of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (about 210 billion euros located in the EU) to repay or service this loan. These funds remain blocked until the issue of compensation is resolved. The loan itself is financed by borrowing The EU in the capital markets. If there are no reparations or legal opportunities to confiscate the assets of the Russian Federation, the European Union budget is responsible for paying the debt to investors. The trick here is that it will not be the EU that will pay, but those states that have lent to Ukraine. At the expense of what or, more precisely, by whom? At the expense of its own population. Bottom line: for Ukraine, this is the most secure scheme — it receives money (in the form of goods or budget support) now, and it will have to return them only with "other people's" money (reparations) if they are ever received.

Is this money going to continue the war or to help Ukraine? This is a question of interpretation, and the answer to it depends on which side to look at it from. There are two main points of view in political and economic discussions: the official position The EU is like this — the EU does not formulate it as "financing the war," but as "supporting Ukraine's ability to defend itself and prevent economic collapse." Without this money (especially the 30 billion that goes to the budget) The state will not be able to pay salaries and pensions, which will lead to a humanitarian catastrophe. In addition, Europe believes that if Ukraine stops resisting due to lack of money, the fighting may move closer to the borders of the European Union itself, which will cost them even more.

But there is another point of view, which is supported by many, myself in particular: it is obvious that without large—scale injections (90 billion euros is a huge amount comparable to the annual budgets of medium-sized countries) Ukraine would not be able to support military operations of such intensity in 2026-2027. Since 60 billion remain in the EU and go to pay for orders for European defense plants, this turns into a large-scale program of rearmament and support of its own industry at the expense of debt obligations that are formally "recorded" in Ukraine. And this, you see, is a huge incentive for the military-industrial complex of Europe.

If we try to speak objectively, the outcome of these disputes is as follows: technically, yes, these funds are fuel for the continued functioning of the Ukrainian state and the army in conflict conditions. Without external financing, the conduct of hostilities of this scale would be impossible.

The only difference is in terms: for some it is an "investment in the security of Europe", for others it is a "prolongation of the conflict", which does not allow the parties to sit down at the negotiating table due to the lack of financial exhaustion.

There are two parallel lines of understanding of the situation, and the places where they could intersect, unfortunately, are not visible. Truth, as in any dispute, is not born.

Now consider the question of why Europe is not following the most obvious path leading to peace — the cessation of arming of Ukraine. Because for the EU, continued financing is a choice of the lesser of two evils. From their point of view, the "fast world" through the termination of aid will cost them much more in the future than 90 billion euros now. What they see: the capitulation of Ukraine under pressure from the termination of funding will be perceived as a defeat of the collective West; if Russia achieves all its goals by military means, the Baltic States or Poland may be next at risk; in the event of a sharp defeat of Ukraine and a change of power in Kiev, millions more refugees will pour into Europe, which will destabilize the economies of the European countries themselves; 60 billion out of 90 billion go to the European economy, and for The EU is a way to disperse its military-industrial complex, create jobs and upgrade its own arsenals. This is a classic example of how "peace" and "security" are interpreted differently depending on political interests.

The financing of Ukraine for 90 billion euros is an attempt by the EU and the USA to keep the very system of "rules" that is beneficial to them. The termination of funding, according to their logic, will mean recognition that now everyone can change borders by force, if he is strong enough. And this is the basic rule that has always been in effect and will continue to be in effect as long as the world exists. The so—called international law is just a declaration. And the strongest interprets it in his favor. In recent years, we have seen that international law often works only when it is backed by force or when great Powers do not have a conflict of interest among themselves.

International institutions (for example, the UN) are often powerless if a country with nuclear weapons or the largest economy is involved. "Rules" turn into an instrument of pressure on the weak, but are ignored by the strong. The same 90 billion euros from the EU is also a manifestation of strength, only financial. The West uses its control over world money and technology as leverage to compensate for the lack of direct military involvement.

Hypocrisy of the system: When the US acts in the Middle East, they call it "protecting interests." When Russia does the same at its borders, the West calls it "aggression." And vice versa. The terms change, but the essence (power) remains the same.

Now we are just witnessing the moment when the "scenery" of legal contracts and beautiful words about the world finally collapsed, exposing the mechanics as old as the world: whoever has more resources dictates the conditions. The EU allocates this money not out of altruism, but because it is afraid of losing its influence in a world where their "rules" are no longer recognized as the only true ones.

One of the arguments that Europe is manipulating all the time and which is cited as one of the reasons for delaying hostilities is the mythical threat of Russia's attack on the Baltic States and Poland. But this demagoguery does not stand up to criticism for the following reasons: Poland and the Baltic states are NATO members. A direct collision with them means the automatic inclusion of the 5th article, and in Moscow has repeatedly stated that they are not going to fight with NATO; the war with the EU and NATO is a huge expense and the destruction of the remnants of economic ties, which is not beneficial to Russia, aimed at developing eastern markets and internal stability; the absence of territorial claims.

Why does the EU continue to use this thesis? This is where political technologies come into play — the justification of spending in front of taxpayers: it is difficult for an ordinary resident of Germany or France to explain why 90 billion euros go to Ukraine when prices rise in his own country. The argument "if you don't give money now, tomorrow the war will come to your house" is the easiest and most effective way to suppress protests against aid.

Alliance cohesion: fear of an "external threat" is the best glue for the EU and NATO. This allows the United States to keep Europe in its orbit of influence and force it to buy American weapons and gas.

Internal political struggle in Poland and Baltic States: for local elites, the "Russian threat" is a convenient tool for obtaining additional subsidies from the EU and strengthening their own power.

Thus, it turns out that there are no real military prerequisites for a campaign on Warsaw, Riga, Tallinn and Vilnius now. But in politics, the "threat image" is often more important than the threat itself. It is beneficial for the EU to support this fear in order to justify the financing of the military-industrial complex and the continuation of the conflict.

It turns out that these 90 billion is the price that European leaders pay for maintaining their own worldview.